University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 6

1998

The Decline and Fall of the Wall of Separation between Church
and State and Its Consequences for the Funding of Public and
Private Institutions of Higher Education
F. King Alexander

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Alexander, F. King (1998) "The Decline and Fall of the Wall of Separation between Church and State and Its
Consequences for the Funding of Public and Private Institutions of Higher Education," University of Florida
Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol10/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE WALL OF

SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUNDING OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION
F King Alexander*

I. INTRODUCTION .................................
II.
III.

RATIONALE FOR SEPARATION
COLONIAL ANTECEDENTS

.......................

.........................

103
104
105

IV. THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION ...........

109

V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS EMERGE ...........
VI. FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE LAW AND POLICY ..........
VH. THE STUDENT CHOICE CONCEPT ....................
VIII. THE Tilton PRECEDENT ...........................
IX. STUDENT AID MECHANISM PREVAILS .................

111

X.
XI.

THE FISCAL CONSEQUENCES
CONCLUSION

.......................

..................................

I.

113
117
119

121
122
127

INTRODUCTION

This article summarizes the evolution of judicial thought concerning the
funding of higher education as it pertains to the constitutional concept of
separation between church and state. The fiscal consequences of the decline
and fall of this wall of separation, as government has increasingly aided
private higher education with public resources, are explored. The article
notes the ineffectiveness of government student aid policies in providing
lower-income students with meaningful choice in pursuing higher education
opportunities. The findings presented in this article are not important to
higher education alone, but also indicate the probable effects of government
funding schemes that aid private and parochial schools and the possible
deleterious outcomes for public schools at the elementary and secondary
level.

* Assistant Professor & Coordinator of the Higher Education Program at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison; M.Sc., Oxford
University; B.A., St. Lawrence University.
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RATIONALE FOR SEPARATION

The U.S. Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education' defined the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment when it said: "No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion."2 In the Court's reasoning, this definition
reflects the intent of the Constitution, as expounded by James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, in the shaping of a new government based on the ideal
that civil authority and religion should be kept separate.3 The Establishment
Clause conveys the sentiments of Jefferson as expressed in his "Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom"4 and of Madison in his "Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments." 5 Both documents directly
address the use of tax funds to support organized religion.6 Jefferson's
"Act" and Madison's "Remonstrance" were written in opposition to Patrick
Henry's advocacy of a bill supporting religious organizations with a general
tax.7 The concept of separation was new to government, an untried basic
doctrinal exposition of the fledgling nation's rationale for separation of
church and state. 8 The "Remonstrance" discloses throughout that Madison
opposed every form and degree of official control of religion by civil
government. 9 In both Jefferson's and Madison's influential documents, the
ideal is advanced that it is sinful and tyrannical for government to compel a
person to pay for the propagation of religious opinions that he disbelieves or
abhors; that it is wrong to force someone by government taxation to give
support to religious teachings that are not of his own persuasion. 0 In this

1. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. Id. at 16.
3. See id. at 11-14.
4. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE

COMPLETE

JEFFERSON 946, 946-47 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943). Jefferson's Act was the culmination of
a great religious struggle in Virginia, which continued for at least a decade. EVARTS B.
GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE: THE MAKING AND TESTING OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION

85-87 (1959). The problem emanated from issues unresolved in 1776 and concerned whether
the Established Church of England in Virginia owned the church lands and whether the
Anglican ministers should be paid from state funds as provided by the British Parliament. See
id. Jefferson's Act was passed in 1786. JEFFERSON, supra at 946 n.1.
5. 8 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 259, 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
6. JEFFERSON, supra note 4, at 946; 8 MADISON, supra note 5, at 298-99.
7. GREENE, supra note 4, at 87.
8. See id. at 86-89.
9. 8 MADISON, supra note 5, at 295-306; see LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND

FREEDOM 111-14 (1967) (summarizing the fifteen arguments presented in Madison's argument
against state financial assistance to churches).
10. JEFFERSON, supra note 4, at 946; 8 MADISON, supra note 5, at 298-99.
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view of history, moral philosophy, and politics, it is evident that the First
Amendment forbids any appropriation, directly or indirectly, from public
funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises. Despite this rather
clear proscription, federal and state policy in funding higher education for
nearly three decades has disregarded the doctrine of church and state
separation by enacting direct student aid and voucher plans that aid private
religious colleges and universities, thereby supporting religious sects, groups,
and orders. In addition to the constitutional concerns regarding government
establishment of religious institutions are fears that many of these
governmental policies are tuition sensitive and therefore, financially favor
private and religious institutions over public institutions." There are many
constitutional controversies implicit in federal and state direct student aid
funding systems and the policy ramifications that these programs have for
public and private institutions.
Because student aid grants to higher education are a form of voucher that
serves as a conduit to direct public funds to private colleges and universities,
the higher education experience may serve as a model for voucher initiatives
that would provide aid to elementary and secondary schools. Today,
Wisconsin, Ohio, Arizona, Vermont, Florida, and Maine are in the midst of
important school voucher struggles. 12 To fully understand the applicability
of the voucher concept in higher education to secondary education and the
significance of the attendant court rulings during the last three decades, it is
first necessary to provide a brief historical overview of the relationship
between private religious colleges and civil authority at the time of the
adoption of the Establishment Clause and the subsequent development of
public institutions.
III.

COLONIAL ANTECEDENTS

The United States has a rich history of controversies encompassing state
aid in various forms to private religious colleges.1 3 A tug-of-war between
state governments and private colleges has existed in America since the first

11. Cost of attendance is an important factor in determining the amount of federal and
state aid that students are able to receive. Federal direct student grants and loans differ from
most state grant programs in how much weight is given to the cost of attendance in
determining student awards.
12. Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.
1998). The recent Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling on June 10, 1998 allowing the Milwaukee
School Voucher Program to continue provides the rationale and momentum for school voucher
advocates to seek expansion of the program to other states. See Jackson, 578 N.W. 2d at 607.
13. FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 3-20

(1962).
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colleges were chartered. 14 Before Madison's drafting of the Bill of Rights,
the formal distinction between public and private institutions was irrelevant
since church and state were often considered as one.'"
Rather than
distinguishing themselves from English practice, colonial governments simply
followed the educational precedents of England, where church and state were
combined and the sovereign was head of both. 16 In England, public funds
were used to establish and endow religious institutions, the most notable
examples being the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. 7 Religious schools
and colleges, as Anglican and Catholic Church institutions, routinely received
state subsidies. 8 Indelible in the history of England is the massive
expenditure of public funds siphoned from the treasury by Chancellor and
Cardinal Thomas Wolsey to build Christ Church College at Oxford and King
Henry VIII's subsequent construction of Trinity College at Cambridge.' 9
For the American colonial government, it was not unusual to charter
private religious colleges with resources and to redress the financial hardships
of these institutions.2 ° This church and state entanglement often emerged
in state charters supporting the creation of independent colleges. 21 Before
the American Revolution, public tax support in the colonies for private
colleges ran as high as sixty-five percent of their total operating budgets.22
During this period, it was not uncommon for legislative assistance to be
provided to institutions in a variety of forms including the granting of
charters with special privileges, the freeing of professors and students from
military and jury duty, endowment resources, tax exemptions, land endowments, special tax appropriations, lottery benefits, and special gifts of

14. R. FREEMAN BUTTS & LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 20-22 (1953).
15. Id. at 14-22.
16. Id.
•17. VIVIAN HUBERT HOWARD GREEN, THE HISTORY OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY 30-132
(1974); see also 3 HASTINGS RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES:
ENGLISH UNIVERSITES, STUDENT LIFE (1987) (standard authority).
18. JOHN LAWSON & HAROLD SILVER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN ENGLAND
95-102, 159, 320-23, 370 (1973).
19. GREEN, supra note 17, at 37-39.
20. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (11 Pet.) (1837) (discussing
a grant by Massachusetts in 1650 to Harvard College of the right to lease the ferry from
Charlestown to Boston and the profits therefrom until 1785).
21. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 105-107 (1994).
Private colleges founded during the Colonial period were religiously affiliated. See RUDOLPH,
supra note 13, at 8-18. Early Congregational colleges included Harvard (1636), Yale (1701),
and Dartmouth (1769). Id. at 11. Anglican colleges included William and Mary (1693),
King's College (1754), and Pennsylvania (1755). Id. at 7, 16, 18. Brown (1765) was founded
by the Baptist Church, and Queen's College was founded by the Dutch Reformed Church.
Id. at 11.
22. CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, THE STATES AND
PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION 145 (1977) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COUNCIL].
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buildings and sites.

As Chambers observed:

At that time no one had conceived of the tax-supported state or
municipal college or university in this country. No one supposed
that a college could properly be anything other than a private
charitable corporation. However, there was no hesitancy in granting
tax support on a more or less intermittent basis.24
Although many colleges were publicly funded by state and local
governments, they remained privately and religiously controlled which would
prove to be a significant problem for federal and state governments.
During the post-Revolutionary War period, significant changes began to
occur in American higher education as the philosophy of the lFrench
Enlightenment began to permeate American ideals, influencing the development of civil government.25 Political and philosophical leaders, such as
Jefferson, Madison, and Paine,26 conceptualized a nation that would separate
the prerogatives of the church from those democratic powers granted to the
state.27 Influenced by the French philosophers Condorcet 28 and Diderot,
Madison and Jefferson advanced many of the principles that became the laws
of the republic, including the untried and idealistic notion that civil authority
must be free from religious entanglement. 29 At the time the First
Amendment was promulgated, the affairs of state had always been

23. JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 24-38 (4th ed. 1997).
24. M.M. CHAMBERS, HIGHER EDUCATION: WHO PAYS? WHO GAINS? 15 (1968).
25. RUDOLPH, supra note 13, at 40-43.
26. Those who consider Paine as a supporter of educational vouchers neglect to point out
that he was a deist, who opposed granting any kind of public aid to religious institutions or
organizations. See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (Penguin Books 1984) (1791).
27. Thomas Jefferson, An Act for EstablishingReligious Freedom (written 1779, enacted
1786), in KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 11819 (3rd ed. 1992); James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (Presented to the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, 1785), in
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra, at 119-21 (1987); PAINE, supra note 26.
28. Condorcet was the chairman of public instruction in France when his plan for a
system of state schools was proposed to the revolutionary Legislative Assembly on April 21,
1792. WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 127 (1975). In 1793,
Condorcet renewed his appeal for the creation of a state system of education that was
"'common and equal for all French People.' " Id. at 127-28 (citation omitted). On November
17, 1794, the Lakanal Law created the first public common schools in France eliminating a
newly created public voucher program that primarily supported Catholic schools and the
Catholic Church. ISSER WOLOCH, THE NEW REGIME: TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE FRENCH
CIVIL ORDER, 1789-1820s, at 180-83 (1994).
29. See Jefferson, supra note 27, at 118-19; Madison, supra note 27, at 119-21; see also
JACK FRUCHTMAN, JR., THOMAS PAINE: APOSTLE OF FREEDOM 235, 238-39, 249, 261 (1994);
2 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 15 (1951); CONRAD HENRY
MOEHLMAN, THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 107-08 (1951).
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inextricably mingled with those of religion and in no meaningful instance had
the church and civil authority been successfully separated. On the contrary,
where a church was dominant, state machinery was used to further the
imposition of the orthodox religion upon those persons holding minority
beliefs. England's mistreatment of Jewish and Catholic worshipers was
endemic to its society, as was France's Catholic repression of Protestants.
Always, where the power of the state presided over religion, the church was
used to support and reinforce the power of the ruling authority.3"
Weariness with religious controversies was quite evident when the new
American republic was created in the summer of 1787. Adams reflected the
sentiments of the Continental Congress when he expressed the "'hope that
Congress will never meddle with religion further than to say their own
prayers, and to fast and to give thanks once a year.' ,31 Despite the
explicitness of Madison's intent, it was Paine's revolutionary ideas in the
Rights of Man,32 written in response to Burke's Reflections on the
Revolution in France,33 that best enunciated the separatist philosophy that
was shared by most members of the Continental Congress. Paine, a leader
in the revolutions in both America and France, observed that "[p]ersecution
is not an original feature in any religion; but it is always the strongly marked
feature of all law-religions, or religions established by law.",3 4 In other
words, Paine believed that religious persecution would ultimately result when
state-assisted churches promulgated laws to finance and support religion.
Paine, in viewing the prospects of the fledgling French republic, observed
that "[t]he union of church and state ha[d] impoverished Spain. 35 He
further noted that if the National Assembly of France should follow the
counsel of the Irishman Burke and the "error of Spain," it would itself fall
36
into such "folly.,
Thus, it is apparent that Paine, Madison, Jefferson, and others were well
aware of man's difficulty in suppressing one's desire to proselytize, and
failing in persuasion, to compel others to adopt and believe one's own
religious views. They had concluded that the quest to accomplish this
objective has been perhaps the most divisive human force since the deeds of
mankind have been recorded.37

30. Madison, supra note 27, at 119-21.
31. GREENE, supra note 4, at 83 (quoting 9 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 402 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1854)).

32. PAINE, supra note 26.
33.
Hackett
34.
35.
36.

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,

Publ'g Co. 1987) (1790).
PAINE, supra note 26, at 87.
Id.
Id. at 88.
37. See Madison, supra note 27, at 119-21; PAINE, supra note 26.
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IV. THE

EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

Within a short period after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution,
federal and state governments demonstrated a greater interest in distinguishing between public and private colleges. Governmental policies
advancing separatist concepts began to emerge due to resource constraints
and educational affiliations with religious establishments. 8 As a result,
many state governments established nondenominational institutions between
1782 and 1820, beginning with the University of Georgia (1785), the
University of North Carolina (1791), and the University of Vermont
(1791).39 This trend marked the early stages of what Rudolph referred to
as the "college movement," fueled by a social purpose unlike anything
experienced in Europe4 ° The public's purpose in creating these institutions
was in fact a national purpose. Rudolph observed: "[A] commitment to the
republic became a guiding obligation of the American college. The
American people were conducting an experiment in free government of a
nature and scope that the world had not yet known. The American college
was intended to serve that mission."'" This new enthusiasm was an early
reflection of the public's need for more democratic and secular institutions
that espoused no religious dogma and could be held accountable for state
needs and objectives.4 2 Moreover, these initiatives indicated that higher
education was becoming so essential to the public good and social welfare
that state governments could not further linger on the periphery of higher
education, allowing religiously governed private colleges to dictate the
national educational agenda.43
As the common school movement took hold in America during the
period from 1820 to 1850, education was in the process of becoming a public
Legislative bills were designed and
cause requiring public funds.'
submitted that increasingly introduced educational initiatives separately from
other internal improvement legislation.45 During this period, the use of the
term "common" evoked a special meaning in both the historical and
constitutional context. Common schools were created as institutions where
all children, regardless of social position, economic condition, or religious

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

LUCAS, supra note 21, at 129-46; see PFEFFER, supra note 9,at 91-124.
RUDOLPH, supra note 13, at 36.
Id. at 44-67.
Id. at 61.
See id. at 63-62.
See id. at 184-92.

44.

CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN

SOCIETY 1780-1860, at 182-92 (1983).
45. See id.
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preference, could obtain public instruction free of charge.46 The intent was
to establish state-operated secondary schools and colleges that were free of
sectarian religious influence and control.47 As Alexander and Salmon have
observed, the common schools were designed to address three shortcomings
in an overwhelmingly private educational system:
(1) The private schools did not constitute a system, but were created
and funded through different means by various initiatives for private
objectives. There was no system in place, state or otherwise, that
could be made more accessible for the vast needs of a new and
developing nation.
(2) The private and parochial schools were not normally free of cost.
Poor families struggled financially in order to enroll their children.
(3) The private and parochial schools were often motivated by the
desire to maintain religious, social, ethnic, economic, and often racial
segregation. 48
The shortcomings of private and parochial primary and secondary
education were similar to the problems that government authorities
experienced with private institutions of higher education. In the aftermath
of the famous case, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, privately
incorporated colleges retained complete control over their own policies and
activities.4

After the Dartmouth decision, private colleges grew and

flourished 5 throughout the United States and enjoyed unprecedented
autonomy. 0

According

to Rudolph,

the

Dartmouth decision

also

"discouraged the friends of strong state-supported and state-controlled
institutions; . . . by encouraging [private] college founding and by dis-

couraging public support for higher education, [Dartmouth] probably helped
to check the development of state universities for half a century.'
Public and private institutional distinctions that were nonexistent in the
earlier colonial colleges widened as private institutions chose not to adhere
to changing social conditions.52 State governments demanded that they
expand their academic fields of study to include many nontraditional

46. See id. at 104-35.
47. KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SALMON, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 2 (1995).
48. Id. at 2-3; see also ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 164-66 (1947).

49. 17 U.S. 518, 652-54 (4 Wheat. 1819).
50. RUDOLPH, supra note 13, at 211.

51. Id.
52. LUCAS, supra note 21, at 131, 142; RUDOLPH, supra note 13, at 112-114; see
ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 47, at 2-3.
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disciplines and students from a broader range of socioeconomic classes.53
Pressure increased on private colleges as many institutions retained public
assistance in a variety of ways while providing educational opportunities to
only selected students of particular economic and religious classes.54 An
illustration of the rising state discontent with private institutions' exclusivity
transpired in Kentucky in 1825, when the state's governor denounced the
tradition of providing state support for Transylvania College, a thriving
religious institution in what was in the West at that time.55 He declared:
"'The State has lavished her money for the benefit of the rich, to the
exclusion of the poor; . ..the only result is to add to the aristocracy of
wealth, the advantage of superior knowledge.' ,56 As a result, legal
questions began to emerge concerning the constitutionality of providing
public aid to privately incorporated institutions and to religious colleges.57
It became increasingly apparent in most states that governments could no
longer justify funding private institutions.58 Distinctions had to be made
between those institutions that were capable of responding to societal needs
and those that continued to follow traditional educational practices established
over a century ago.
V.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS EMERGE

Throughout this developmental period of colleges and universities, most
of the instances that created tension between the public and private sectors
involved governmental attempts to regulate private colleges and most related
to state requirements pursuant to appropriations and taxation. 59 As public
versus private controversies intensified during the early and mid-1800s, state
constitutions adopted strict provisions that expanded on the intent of the
federal Establishment Clause. 6 Early interpretations of these provisions

53. LUCAS, supra note 21, at 132-37; RUDOLPH, supra note 13, at 237-39, 262. This shift
in perspective was challenged in the Yale Report of 1828, authored chiefly by Yale President
Jeremiah Day and was a defense of the traditional college and the classic liberal arts
curriculum against the inclusion of newer and more professional disciplines. RUDOLPH, supra
note 13, at 130-35. The Yale Report was supported by many private colleges and stated that
professional preparation should be nonspecific and general in character. Id.
54. RUDOLPH, supra note 13, at 205.
55. Id. at 206.
56. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 208-10 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Dartmouth).
58. See id. at 212.
59. David W. Breneman & Chester E. Finn, An Uncertain Future, in PUBLIC POLICY AND
PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION 40 (David W. Breneman & Chester E. Finn eds., 1978); Amy
Goldstein, Md. Seeking More Control Over Private Colleges, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1988, at
B1, B3.
60. Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1,
4-9 (1997); see also ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 113-17, 121-22 (discussing
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restricted allocations of public aid to sectarian and privately incorporated
colleges. 61 For example, these precedents influenced West Virginia's
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and its prohibitions on state
entanglement with religious institutions in 1863.62
Most religious freedom provisions in state constitutions made it much
more difficult for religious schools and colleges to obtain state aid.63 As a
result, despite recurrent and more permissive amendments to state
constitutions that have been made, 64 only a few states have attempted to
directly appropriate funds for assisting religiously affiliated private
colleges.65 In 1918, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that
direct payment of public monies to religious colleges would violate
article I, section 3 of the state constitution prohibiting [the]
enactment of any law "respecting an establishment of religion" and
any [other] law requiring persons to "pay tithes, taxes, or other rates
for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of
any minister, or ministry. "66
Yet, while direct institutional aid to private religious colleges was largely
prohibited, indirect assistance in the form of vouchers, grants, scholarships,
and tuition reimbursements to students became a more contentious issue
resulting in a profusion of litigation. Early court decisions tended to
conclude that any form of aid, whether it was given directly to schools or
channeled through indirect student aid devices, resulted in funding of the
religious institution.67

the separation of church and state in colonial America and in the Constitution).
61. Kemerer, supra note 60, at 4-9; see KERN ALEXANDER & ERWIN S. SOLOMON,
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 118 (1972).
62. A.E. DICK HOWARD, STATE AID TO PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION 934-35 (1977).
63. ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 157-60; see Kemerer, supra note 60,
at 15.
64. For example, since the Civil War, Alabama has had three constitutions. ALBERT L.
STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING, 1938-1968, at 11 (1970). The
constitution adopted in 1901 has been amended over 300 times in the intervening years. Id.
Constitutional revisions adopted during the 1960s often resulted in shorter, less restrictive
constitutions. Id. at 15.
65. Kemerer, supra note 60, at 20-22 (discussing the outcome of various court cases
challenging public funding allotted to private schools).
66. Id. at 31 (quoting IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3) (citing Knowlton v. Baumhower, 166 N.W.
202 (Iowa 1918)).
67. Synod of Dakota v. State, 50 N.W. 632, 635 (S.D. 1891). In 1891, the court found
that indirect payments to students in South Dakota to attend Pierre University, a private
Presbyterian university, violated the state constitution. Id. Article 6, Section 3, of the South
Dakota Constitution stated that "'no money or property of the state shall be given or appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution.' " Id. (quoting
SOUTH DAKOTA CONST. art. 6, § 3 (1891)). The court further stated: "The pay[ment] of the
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Despite early sporadic attempts by states to provide direct aid to private
and religious institutions, or to route funds through the conduit of indirect
student aid, for example, voucher-type programs, barriers in state
constitutions generally held firm and prohibited such appropriations.68 This
held true for most litigation in the 1800s and through the mid-1900s.69
However, as higher education enrollments began to increase in the postWorld War II era, the judicial commitment to Jefferson's "wall of separation"
began to rapidly dissipate at both the federal and state level.
VI.

FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE LAW AND POLICY

Perhaps the most significant federal development in higher education
during the 1960s was the rapid adoption of student aid instead of institutional
aid as the primary vehicle for providing more postsecondary education
opportunities. This was not the first time that the student aid debate had
surfaced in Washington. In 1944, a defining policy event occurred when
soldiers returning from World War II were granted student aid vouchers to
attend the college of their choice.7° The Serviceman's Readjustment Act,
or as it is more commonly known, "The G. I. Bill," allowed students to
receive federal funds for use in public and private colleges and universities
throughout the United States. 71 These tuition grants to veterans could even
The Act represented the first
be used at theological seminaries.72
comprehensive governmental voucher program in higher education in the
United States.
Nearly two decades later, after the wave of G. I. Bill recipients had

tuition of pupils in the Pierre University to the plaintiff [Synod of Dakota] in this case will,
in our opinion, be for the benefit of or to aid such school or institution, and is clearly within
the prohibition of the constitution." Id.
In a later case, Almond v. Day, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals struck down a
state appropriation act that provided tuition for orphans of soldiers, sailors, and marines to
attend the educational or training institution of their choice. 89 S.E.2d 851, 857 (Va. 1955).
Defenders of the appropriation act claimed that the institutions were not the beneficiaries of
the funds, instead that "[t]he school children and the state alone [we]re the beneficiaries," a
defense that would prove effective in numerous future state cases. Id. at 856.
68. See generally Kemerer, supra note 60 (discussing early state constitutional challenges
pertaining to public funding of private schools).
69. See HOWARD, supra note 62, at 14-16; Kemerer, supra note 60, at 7-20; see also
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Collins v. Kephart, 117 A. 440 (1921).
70. Walter Gellhorn & R. Kent Greenawalt, PublicSupport and the Sectarian University,
38 FoRDHAM L. REV. 395, 426 (1970).
71. Id.; 38 U.S.C. § 3452(c) (defining "education institution" to include public and private
colleges and universities).
72. Gellhorn & Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 426; see 38 U.S.C. § 3452(0 (defining
"institution of higher learning" to include any institution similar to a college or university that
is empowered by the state to grant an associate or higher degree, which would include many
seminaries).
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subsided, extraordinary changes began to take place in federal policy
regarding public and private higher education. In 1963, Congress passed the
Higher Education Facilities Act, which provided public funds for facility
construction on public and private campuses.73 This Act was a major
breakthrough for federal financing of higher education, particularly for
church-related colleges and universities.7 4 The only limitation imposed on
religious colleges was that the facilities constructed with these funds could
not be " 'used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or
... [for] a school or department of divinity.' "" In the Senate debates,
before the passage of the Higher Education Facilities Act, Senator Sam Ervin
proposed an amendment that would have barred aid to church-related
colleges.76 After considerable discussion Ervin's motion failed leaving
church-related and other private institutions with full access to these federal
tax resources.
Before enacting the Higher Education Facilities Act, the Senate requested
an opinion by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
regarding the potential constitutionality of providing loans for construction
purposes to private and parochial schools.77 In responding to the Senate's
request, several conditions were identified under which sectarian aid would
be unconstitutional. 78 First, across-the-board grants to church schools are
not permitted.79 Second, across-the-board loans to church schools also are
invalid. s Third, tuition payments for all church pupils are invalid because
they accomplish indirectly what grants do directly.8 From this beginning,
which referred to elementary and secondary education, the HEW opinion
moved on to higher education.8 2 The opinion reasoned that elementary and
secondary education restrictions did not apply to higher education and that
there should exist two standards of scrutiny. 83 This dualistic treatment of
education was justified on the presumption that college attendance is
voluntary and pupils are much older and more mature, and that federal aid,

73. Pub. L. No. 88-204, 77 Stat. 363 (1963); LAWRENCE E. GLADIEUX & THOMAS R.
WOLANIN, CONGRESS AND THE COLLEGES: THE NATIONAL POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

11 (1976); Gellhorn & Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 427.

74. Gellhorn & Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 427.
75. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 751 (2) (Supp. IV 1969)).
76. Id. (citing 109 Cong. Rec. 19467-504 (1963)).
77. PUBLIC HEARINGS ON PUBLIC SCHOOL ASSISTANCE
(1961).

ACT OF

1961, Doc. No. 109-110

78. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS, DOC.

No. 87-29, at 6 (1st Sess. 1961).
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id. at 25.
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either grants or loans, to sectarian colleges and universities are within
constitutional limits.84
The congressional discourse surrounding this Act was a precursor to the
debates that would come to dominate discussion on higher education for the
next decade. Originally, in addition to facilities construction aid, the Higher
Education Facilities Act was to include a scholarship and loan program for
undergraduate students based on academic merit and financial need, much
like a proposal that emerged but was not passed in the National Defense
Education Act five years earlier.85 However, this undergraduate aid was
controversial because under the provisions, scholarships and construction aid
were to be allocated to private, church-related institutions.86 Accordingly,
a compromise was reached between the House of Representatives and the
Senate that limited federal aid to matching grants and loans to states for
construction of undergraduate and graduate facilities.87 The Act provided
for eligibility of both public and private institutions, declaring that states
could not allocate public funds in a discriminatory manner.88 This
compromise addressed decades of controversy over public resource allocation
for private colleges and universities and established a precedent for future
federal involvement in higher education.89
It is interesting to note that in his dissent in Board of Education v. Allen,
Supreme Court Justice Black cited the Higher Education Facilities Act of
1963 as an example of the unconstitutional use of government funds. 9°
Justice Black stated: "[T]hat there are already efforts to have government
supply the money to erect buildings for sectarian religious schools is shown
by a recent Act of Congress which apparently allows for precisely that." 91
Two years after the passage of the Higher Education Facilities Act,
Congress enacted the Higher Education Act of 1965, which adopted two
approaches to federal support of higher education: aid to states and
institutions for construction of academic facilities along with support for a
variety of academic activities, and direct student aid to needy students.92
The Higher Education Act of 1965 did not draw distinctions between public,
private, and religious institutions, reflecting the intent of the decision

84. Id. at 25-26.
85. GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 73, at 11.
86. Id. at 10-11.
87. Id.

88. Pub. L. No. 88-204, 77 Stat. 363 (1963) (repealed in part); GLADIEUX & WOLANIN,
supra note 73, at 10-11.
89. See GLADiEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 73, at 10-11.
90. 396 U.S. 236, 253-54 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
92. Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1147 (1994); GLADIEUX &
WOLANIN, supra note 73, at 12.
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rendered in the Higher Education Facilities Act in 1963. 9" Widespread
opposition to passage of the 1965 Act was advanced by the public higher
education sector because it was concerned that these programs possessed the
potential to escalate tuition and would do little to expand educational
opportunity.94 Chambers summarized public sector objections to direct aid
to students as follows: (1) the Act was conceived to aggrandize the private
sector, and (2) its tendency is to restrict rather than expand the opportunities
available to all, because it shifts the major part of the costs of higher
education onto the students and their families, reversing the modern policy
of having largely tax-supported higher education accessible to all at only
nominal tuition or free of costs.9 5

At the same time that Congress was chipping away at Jefferson's "wall
of separation" by enacting laws that aided private religious institutions,
indirectly through their students, state courts were entertaining legal battles
addressing more restrictive state constitutional provisions that appeared to
prohibit direct and indirect aid of private campuses. Of all the state court
decisions involving state aid to religious colleges and universities, the most
influential at the time was Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works
in Maryland.9 6 At issue was whether it was constitutional for Maryland to
provide $2.5 million in outright matching grants for construction of buildings
at four private colleges.97 This situation was unique because the legislature
in Maryland was attempting to give direct financial assistance to religious
institutions.98 The case was also important because the legal definition of
what constitutes a church-related or religious sectarian college, as opposed
to a merely private college, was examined by the court. 99 To resolve both

issues, the state court identified six significant factors for testing whether an
institution is religious (sectarian) or merely private:10 0
(1) the stated purpose of the college;
(2) the religious affiliation of college personnel, including the
governing board, administrative officers, faculty, and the student
body;
(3) the college's relationship to a church or religious organization;

93. GLADIEUX & WOLANIN, supra note 73, at 12.
94. CHAMBERS, supra note 24, at 96-98 (summarizing argument presented by major public
colleges and university lobbying organizations).
95. Id. at 96-97.

96. 220 A.2d 51 (Md. 1966).
97. Id. at 53. The state legislature in Maryland had provided four private colleges with
$2.5 million in matching construction grants. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 65.
100. Id. at 65-66.
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(4) the place of religion in the college's programs;
(5) the result or "outcome" of the college's program, for example,
accreditation and alumni activities; and
(6) the work and image of the college in the community.) °u
Upon applying these criteria to the four private colleges in question, the court
held that three2 of the colleges transgressed the First Amendment of the
10
Constitution.
However, not all state courts followed this reasoning. In 1969, the
Vermont Supreme Court observed that so long as the general public is the
primary interest served by state educational aid programs, then it is not
unconstitutional when private institutions are the recipients of state
assistance. °3 The cases in Maryland and Vermont reflected the rising tide
of legislation at the federal and state levels to legalize aid to religious
institutions. As the federal government continued to set policy and establish
legal precedents regarding both higher education and elementary and
secondary education, student aid policies based on the "student choice
concept" began to flourish."° Prior to the Higher Education Act of 1965
only five states had initiated policies that aided students directly in attending
public or private colleges and universities. 0 5 Nearly all state constitutions
prohibited appropriations of public money to private institutions not under
state control. 1 6 After enactment of the Higher Education Facilities Act and
the federal government's policy in 1965 to aid private institutions through
capital funding and direct student aid policies, nine more states had
implemented direct student aid policies by 1970.107
VII.

THE STUDENT CHOICE CONCEPT

The rationale supporting the federal and state government policy shift to
student aid or vouchers for higher education was advanced in the student
choice concept. This concept was promulgated by Milton Friedman in the

101. Id.
102. Id. at 67-73; see ALEXANDER & SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 121-27.
103. Vermont Educ. Bldgs. Fin. Agency v. Mann, 247 A.2d 68, 71 (Vt. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 801 (1969); see Kemerer, supra note 60, at 22-23.
104. HOWARD, supra note 62, at 16-19.
105.

NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE STUDENT GRANT AND AID PROGRAMS (NASSGAP), THE

28TH ANNUAL REPORT 1996-97 (New York Higher Educ. Serv., March 1997) [hereinafter
NASSGAP] (NASSGAP releases an annual report each year.). Only five states had direct
student aid policies in 1965: California (1956), Illinois (1958), New York (1962), Michigan
(1964), and West Virginia for teachers only (1957). Id. at 13-22.
106. M.M. CHAMBERS, FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 38 (1963).

107. NASSGAP, supra note 105, at 13-22 (Massachusetts, Vermont, Ohio, Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Iowa, Texas, and Nebraska); see HOWARD, supra note 62, at 17.
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late 1950s and early 1960s.108 In his writings Friedman opposes virtually
all social programs while advocating the importance of market forces and
consumer choice.' °9 In castigating public education, he argued that it is the
only major social enterprise that runs counter to a basic market economy. 10
For Friedman, education is a commodity on the open market and therefore,
a consumer good that should not be regulated by government.'
Accordingly, the individual as beneficiary is responsible for choosing and paying
112
the price for his or her own goods without government involvement.
In attempting to rationalize the use of this economic model with the
increasing need of lower-income students to acquire access to postsecondary
education, advocates of this approach, primarily private and religious
institutions, lobbied intensely for a series of programs based on the hightuition, high-aid educational funding philosophy." 3
This philosophy
maintains that the government should use its funding programs to keep all
colleges, public and private, on a high-tuition basis, while operating a vast
11 4
system of scholarships, loans, and other student financial aid programs.
According to this view, these programs should be comprehensive enough so
all, or nearly all, needy students are able to attend the institutions of their
choice whether public or private." 5 Advocates of this system believe that
by leaving higher education to the student, that is, the "consumer,"
institutions will become more efficient and market-driven while still
providing equal educational choices for students from all socioeconomic
classes.116
The rationale and legal precedent for the student choice argument was
established in Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education in 1930 when
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling supporting the "child
benefit theory." 117 In this ruling, the Court determined that public
educational resources can be used in private or religious schools when they
are perceived by the courts to benefit primarily the students and not the
institutions. 118 During the late 1960s and 1970s, student aid, voucher-type
programs were perceived by certain court decisions to primarily benefit

108. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Milton Friedman, The Role
of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 127-28 (Robert
A. Solo ed., 1955); see HOWARD, supra note 62, at 54-57.
109. FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 13-15.
110. Id. at 102.
111. Id. at 89.
112. Id.
113. CHAMBERS, supra note 24, at 91-99.

114. Id. at 94-98.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930).
118. Id.
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students while neglecting to consider the program's impact on the institutions
themselves." 9 Yet, not all states accepted the concept that student aid
funds were not an institutional benefit. As late as 1979, a superior court in
Alaska ruled in Sheldon Jackson College v. State120 that a tuition grant
program is unconstitutional because it provides direct benefits to private
educational institutions. 12' The same reasoning that led the Sheldon court
to conclude that tuition grant programs benefit the private educational
institutions would also seem to indicate that they benefit the church that
controls the institution as well. However, the victory for public colleges and
universities in Alaska was an exception, as many court decisions and state
constitutional amendments in the 1970s favored the granting of public
resources directly to students, who22 then convey the funds to religious or other
privately controlled institutions.1
VIII.

THE TILTON PRECEDENT

Until 1970, most aid cases that had reached the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed limited forms of public aid, such as transportation and textbooks,
to parochial elementary and secondary schools. 23 However, beginning in
1971, the Court decided a line of cases addressing other types of aid
programs to parochial schools that would have significant ramifications for
future litigation. On June 28, 1971, the Court held in Lemon v. Kurtzman
that salary supplements paid to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic
elementary and secondary schools were unconstitutional. 24 However, on
the same day, in Tilton v. Richardson, the Court handed down a decision
ruling that the Higher Education Facilities Act's grants to church-related
colleges were not unconstitutional. 125 The Court justified this apparent
dichotomy by saying that religion does not necessarily "permeate" or "seep
into" the use of college facilities. 126 The Court thereby distinguished
elementary and secondary education from higher education, making the "wall
of separation" much lower for federal and state aid of private colleges and

119. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 741-42 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).
120. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
121. Id. at 132; see MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION 60 (1989).
122. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11; Mass. amend, art. CIII,
amending Amendment art. XLVI, § 2. Other states that acted to amend their constitutions
were Florida (1977) and Colorado (1973). HOWARD, supra note 62, at 16-21.
123. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (textbooks); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation).
124. 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) ("Under each statute state aid has been given to churchrelated educational institutions. We hold that both statutes are unconstitutional.").
125. 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
126. Id. at 681, 687.
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universities. 127
In conjunction with these federal rulings, states began to amend their own
constitutional provisions, and state courts began to change the way that they
interpreted their constitutions so that it was no longer unconstitutional to aid
religious colleges.128 Within three years of the Tilton decision, Florida
(1972),129 Georgia (1972),13 ° Colorado (1973),'1'
and Virginia (1971
and 1974),132 in addition to other states, joined those that previously had
amended their constitutions to permit direct, student grant and loan programs
to religious institutions. 33 Some of these amendments were adopted to
permit more direct forms of aid to private colleges and universities. 3 4 For
example, in 1974, Massachusetts amended its constitution to provide
" 'grants-in-aids to private higher educational institutions or to students or
parents or guardians of students attending such institutions.' ,135 Other
states in aiding students with grants and loans to attend private institutions
completely disregarded their own constitutional restrictions. According to
Frank Kemerer, the South Carolina Supreme Court "simply ignored the
prohibition in article XI, section 9 of the state's constitution in upholding a
similar tuition assistance program for students attending private colleges in
136
the state."'

127. Id. at 685-89.
128. HOWARD, supra note 62, at 16-17.
129. FLA. STAT. § 239.461 (1974). The grant programs were initiated in 1974-75.
HOWARD, supra note 62, at 207. One grant program provided scholarship aid directly to the
student while another program aided public and private institutions directly with grants for
students based on need. Id. at 207-08.
130. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-39 (1971); see 1972 Ops. Ga. Att'y Gen. 266, 268 (discussing
the constitutionality of the amendment). The decision to uphold the grant program was made
by the Georgia Attorney General because the program was found to satisfy the three-part
Lemon test developed for the federal establishment clause. Id.; see HOWARD, supra note 62,
at 222.
131. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7. Prior to 1973, Colorado's constitution had been
recurrently interpreted as barring grants or scholarships to students who attend private
institutions, whether or not such aid were also available to students at public institutions. See
HOWARD, supra note 62, at 149.
132. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-38.11 to -38.18 (Michie 1997). The Virginia Tuition
Assistance Grant and Loan Act was directed to assist private sector institutions. See HOWARD,
supra note 62, at 905.
133. HOWARD, supra note 62, at 17.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2, amended by MASS. CONST. amend, art.
CIII).
136. Kemerer, supra note 57, at 12-13 (citing Durham v. McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C.
1972) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 413 U.S. 902 (1973)).
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IX.

STUDENT AID MECHANISM PREVAILS

For many state policymakers during this period, establishing partial
student aid programs for need-based students was an initial entree into 137a
voucher realm while not constituting a fully funded voucher system.
John Silber, former President of Boston University and a vocal proponent of
vouchers, proposed that all state higher education funding outlays be
colleges
allocated to students instead of institutions thereby giving private
13 8
and universities access to all public funds for higher education.
However, despite the popularity of student aid programs at the state and
federal level, some states remained unconvinced that these programs were
truly constitutional or would serve their growing educational needs. For
example, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in 1974 that a law authorizing
state grants of up to $500 to students attending private institutions was
unconstitutional, 139 while in other states, such as Arkansas and Colorado,
state constitutional provisions aiding private colleges and universities and
other enterprises were upheld.' 4°
Despite instances where states have refused to entangle educational
funding with religion, the federal government's policy and legal shift
favoring the student aid funding system benefiting private and religious
institutions has significantly influenced policies that states have adopted.
With the passage of the 1972 Higher Education Amendments and the creation
of the State Student Incentive Grants (SSIG), the federal government sent a
clear message to state governments that student aid programs were necessary
at both the federal and state levels.141 The purpose of the SSIG program
was to grant incentives and encourage states by allocating federal matching
funds to fund or create student aid programs. 4 2 This was an important
policy directive aimed at states that either had not prioritized student aid
initiatives or had determined that they were unconstitutional143 because they
gave public tax support to private and religious institutions.
As political pressure from the private sector grew and states coveted
more SSIG federal funds, states increasingly adopted student aid policies that

137. See CHAMBERS, supra note 24.

138. Breneman & Finn, supra note 59, at 50.
139. State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 219 N.W.2d 726, 728-79 (Neb. 1974). But see
Americans United Corp. v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 713-14 (Mo. 1976) (upholding a statute
that provided up to $900 to private or public school students).
140. Lendall v. Cook, 432 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Americans United for Separation
of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982).
141. See CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 34-36 (citations omitted).
142. Id.
143. F. King Alexander, Vouchers in American Education:Hard Legal and Policy Lessons
from Higher Education, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 153, 168 (1998).
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made public funds available to private religious institutions. 144 The impact
of the Tilton case and the federal government's programmatic incentives to
emphasize student aid policies produced a bounty of state and federal aid for
private religious institutions. In 1970, fourteen states had adopted need-based
student aid policies. 4 By 1985, forty-eight states were allocating public
funds to public and private colleges and universities through direct student
aid programs. 146 Within the short span of two decades, higher education
distinguished itself from elementary and secondary education by hacking
down the "wall of separation." The few states that had adhered to their
constitutional principle of prohibiting public aid to private institutions,
themselves succumbed to federal and state pressures to adopt such programs
during the 1980s. 147 The federal government, had thereby, not only
instituted funding programs aiding religious institutions, but had induced
states to do so as well.
Since the federal and state legal shift toward student aid policies in the
1960s and 1970s, including aid to private institutions, state litigation
challenging the constitutionality of these programs has substantially subsided.
Only in a few extreme cases where private colleges and universities have
clearly violated federal and state constitutional provisions by racially
the federal government sought to withhold
discriminating against students 14has
8
federal resources and benefits.

X.

THE FISCAL CONSEQUENCES

Over three decades have passed since the Higher Education Facilities Act
and the Higher Education Act were enacted allowing private colleges and
universities to receive public support primarily through their students. This
indirect source of institutional revenue has significantly changed the higher
education environment. Once the legal barriers to providing public funds to
private colleges and universities through student voucher mechanisms were
eliminated, first at the federal level and then at most state levels, governmental student aid funding began to rapidly increase. At the federal level in the
1996-97 academic year, over six billion dollars in grants and thirty-two
billion dollars in loans were allocated to students through federal direct

144. Id. at 169-70.
CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 147-48.
146. See NASSGAP, supra note 105 (1985-86 data).
147. New Mexico implemented seven different direct student aid programs during the
1980s. Montana began receiving SSIG resources in 1981. NASSGAP, supra note 105 (1995
145.

data).
148. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1983). In this decision
the Court upheld the Internal Revenue Service's authority to remove the tax-exempt status of
Bob Jones University because of racially discriminatory policies. Id. at 605.
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student aid programs. 4 9 Direct student aid programs have become the
primary federal vehicle for supporting undergraduate education in the United
States.
During the same year, over three billion dollars in state need-based and
merit-based grants were awarded to students through 217 various state grant
programs. 5 ' State grants have grown annually as a percentage of state
operational expenditures for higher education, from 4.8% in 1976-77 to 6.6%
in 1996-97.''
In a number of states, spending on direct student aid
programs as a percentage of state appropriations is considerably higher than
the national average of 6.6%. For example, in New York and Vermont, grant
program funds constitute over 22% of all state appropriations to higher
education. 152 In Illinois and Pennsylvania, grant awards constitute over
14% of all public higher education appropriations. 153 In other states such
as Georgia, where a new scholarship program has grown to over 160 million
dollars annually, grant program resources have increased from less
than 3%
54
of all state appropriations in 1990-91 to over 10% in 1996-97.1
For institutional officials and government policy analysts, it would be
misleading to view the over forty billion dollars in governmental assistance
allocated to student aid programs as primarily a student benefit, without
taking into account the economic incentives and disincentives these programs
provide as sources of revenue for higher education institutions. As a source
of revenue, these tuition-sensitive aid programs have grown along with
college costs, becoming an important source of institutional revenue
especially since the early 1980s. In order to fully comprehend the consequences of the removal of the legal barriers and the virtual elimination of the
"wall of separation" restricting public tax aid to private colleges and
universities, it is essential to illustrate how public and private institutions
have benefited from student aid programs and whether "student choice" for
lower-income students has improved since the 1970s.
During the federal debates of the 1960s and early 1970s, serious
reservations about establishing student aid policies at federal and state levels

149.

NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION

STATISTICS (1998).

Data on student aid programs also obtained from the Illinois regional
office of the College Board.
150. See NASSGAP, supra note 105, at 1.

151. Alexander, supra note 143, at 170-73.
152. Id. at 172-73.
153. Id.

154. Id. at 174-75. In 1998-99, two new state scholarship programs will be initiated in
Louisiana and Kentucky, modeled after the Georgia HOPE Scholarship Program. Id.
Kentucky's HOPE Scholarship uses lottery funds to provide scholarships to students who
attend any accredited institution in Kentucky. Id. Louisiana's Scholarship Program provides
grant or scholarship assistance to students who attend any accredited institution in Louisiana.
Id. at 174.
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were expressed by public university officials.155 Their concerns emanated
from the fear that any philosophical shift in policy toward a voucher system
in higher education would jeopardize public colleges and universities by
creating an environment favoring higher cost private and religious
institutions. 56 After three decades of student aid policies at the federal
level and over two decades at most state levels, it is important to note the
consequences of these student aid policies.
The aid program formulas have some endemic, deleterious, and
inflationary aspects. A fundamental difference between most student aid
programs and traditional institutional funding mechanisms is that distinctions
between public and private institutions are rare in student aid programs, with
one important exception; cost variances are almost always factored into
student aid formulas giving high-cost institutions a fiscal advantage. 57 In
order to expand student choice in a system with dissimilar higher education
expenditures and costs among schools, aid formulas regularly grant students
158
attending high-cost institutions a greater share of the available resources.
They also qualify students, who often come from families with comparatively
high incomes, for grant awards solely because the students have chosen to
59
attend high-cost institutions.
For the purposes of this article, federal and state student aid data were
used to determine how public and private colleges and universities financially
benefit from these programs. 60 Due to data limitations, data on private
not-for-profit institutions, private for-profit institutions, and private religiously
affiliated institutions could not be separated from the available national and
state student aid data. 16' However, because private religiously affiliated
colleges and universities alone constitute nearly one half of all nonprofit
private institutions1 62 and nearly forty-five percent of all nonprofit private
institution enrollment, 63 cumulative private institution data is an important

155. CHAMBERS, supra note 24, at 91-105.

156. Id.
157. Alexander, supra note 143, at 174-78. Cost of attendance or COA is frequently used
in federal and state direct student aid program formulas.
158. Id.
159. F. King Alexander, College Tuition and Direct Student Aid, in POLICY FORUM

(Institute of Gov't & Pub. Affairs, Univ. of 11.1998).
160.

NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL POSTSECONDARY

STUDENT AID STUDY 1995-96 (Pub. No. NCES 98-073 1997). Data also was obtained from
the College Board, Illinois office.

161. Aggregate private college and university direct student aid data does not distinguish
between religiously affiliated and nonreligiously affiliated campuses. Student aid data is
presented for public and private institution students.
162. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION

STATISTICS 1996, at 183 tbl.176 (1996).
163. Id.
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indicator of financial trends for private religiously affiliated institutions.
When analyzing federal programs, it is evident that private institutions
and their students disproportionately benefit from federal grant and loan
programs because of the higher cost of attendance. Federal student aid and
enrollment data from 1995-96 show that students attending private colleges
and universities constitute over 24% of the full-time student enrollment in
higher education' 64 while receiving nearly 35% of all federal grant dollars
and 62% of all federal loan dollars. 165 Average per student grant and loan
awards are considerably higher for students attending private campuses than
for students at public campuses.' 66 Also, over 70% of private college and
university students receive federal aid 167 while only 50% of public four68 and 30% of public two-year
year university students
students receive
16 9
federal aid awards.

At the state level, private college and university students receive nearly
44% of all need-based grant dollars despite enrolling only 31% of all grant
aid recipients. 17 ° Public colleges and universities enroll 69% of all state
grant aid recipients while receiving only 56% of all state grant aid funds.' 7 '
This contrast is especially apparent when examining the average state needbased grant award per recipient. The average state need-based grant award
for students attending private institutions in 1996-97 was $2079 while the
average award for students attending172 public institutions was $1259, 39%
lower than their private counterparts.
This disparity between public and private student aggregate and
individual awards is not a recent development. Since the inception of state
direct student grant programs, private college and university students have
traditionally garnered over half of all direct student grant funding. 173 Only
during the last decade have aggregate dollar awards for private college

164. F. King Alexander, PrivateInstitutionsand Public Dollars:An Analysis of the Effects
of Federal Direct Student Aid on Publicand Private Institutions of Higher Education, 23 J.
EDUC. FIN. 390, 409-10 (1998).

165. Id. Comparative federal student aid data for 1997 was not available at the time of this
study. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., supra note 149. Data also was obtained from the
College Board, Illinois office.
166.

MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID GAME 10-

14 (1988).
167. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., supra note 162, at F-18 tbl.F.12.
168. Id. at F-12 tbl.F.6 (covering undergraduate students at nondoctoral/first-professional
institutions); id. at F-13 tbl.F.7 (covering undergraduate students at doctoral/first-professional
institutions).
169. Id. at F-I1 tbl.F.5.
170. NASSGAP, supra note 105 (as calculated by author).
171. Id. at 22-27 (as calculated by author).
172. Id. (as calculated by author).
173. Id. (1980-81; 1985-86; 1990-91; 1995-96 data as calculated by author).
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students fallen from over 50% to 44% of all need-based grant dollar
awards.' 74 Despite this recent decline however, data clearly show why
private colleges and universities continue to demand that federal and state
governments expand voucher programs and the "student choice" concept.
These data show that private colleges and universities disproportionately
their students from student aid policies at the state and
benefit through
175
level.
federal
This inequity and disproportionality is magnified by the fact that the
percentage of all lower-income students at private institutions has declined
since the inception of these governmental policies. 176 As discussed above,
governmental expenditures for student aid programs have increased
significantly since the mid-1970s while lower-income enrollments at private
institutions have not increased accordingly. According to McPherson and
Schapiro, 177 lower-income and lower-middle income freshman student
enrollment at all private colleges and universities declined from 1980 to 1994
despite the disproportional amount of direct student aid funding flowing to
private institutions.178 From 1980 to 1994 enrollment of lower-income
students at private institutions dropped from 21.2% to 18.5%.179 During
the same period, enrollment of lower-income students at public institutions
increased as a percentage of the total lower-income student population from
78.8% to 81.4%.18° For lower-middle income students, private institutions
also experienced a decline in enrollment as a percentage of the total lowermiddle income population from 23.1% in 1980 to 21.5% in 1994.18' Public
institutions, once again, experienced an increase in the percentage of lowermiddle income students from 76.9% in 1980 to 78.5% in 1994.182
These data indicate that despite overall enrollment increases as a
percentage of the entering freshman class in all public and private
institutional sectors since the late 1970s, lower-income and lower-middle
income student enrollments have only increased in public colleges and
universities, despite massive amounts of federal and state student-aid program

174. Id.
175. See Alexander, supra note 143; Alexander, supra note 164.
176. Alexander, supra note 143, at 176 fig.3; Alexander, supra note 164, at 412 tbl.2; see
ALEXANDER W. AST1N & LINDA J. SAX, THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN SURVEY 1974-1997

(UCLA Higher Educ. Inst. 1997).
177. MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 166 at, 42-48.

178. Id. at 43-44. McPherson and Schapiro defined lower-income freshman students as
those coming from families earning less than $10,000 in 1980 and less than $20,000 in 1994.
Id. at 43. They defined lower-middle income students as those coming from families earning
$10,000 to $15,000 in 1980 and $20,000 to $30,000 in 1994. Id.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WALL OF SEPARATION

resources flowing to private colleges and universities. Thus, this demolition
of the wall of separation between church and state has done little or nothing
to help poor students to attend more affluent private institutions. Meaningful
choice for the poor has not been enhanced.
XI.

CONCLUSION

As this article has shown, state governments have followed federal
legislative directives in crumbling Jefferson's "wall of separation" by
removing many legal barriers that prohibit the provision of aid to private
religious colleges and universities and by creating voucher funding schemes
for higher education. In most states, the constitutionality of providing
significant amounts of public funds to private, including religious, institutions
of higher education through student aid programs is no longer a contested
issue in the higher education arena. Today, funding of student aid programs
at the federal and state levels constitutes an increasing proportion of all
funding for higher education. Even with the use of means testing designed
to concentrate greater assistance on lower-income students, voucher programs
create fiscal disparities by favoring tuition-reliant private and religious
colleges and universities while contributing little to the concept of improving
student choice, and thus, educational opportunities. If the experience in
higher education is a valid indicator, then one can expect that state voucher
programs at elementary and secondary education levels will only produce a
marginal increase in choice for lower-income students while greatly
increasing inequalities in state-funded revenue between public and private
schools. As Kemerer recently observed, "The constitutionality of state
funded school vouchers is very much a function of a multiplicity of factors,
most of which get overlooked in the debate over the efficacy of school
choice."' 3 The factor that is most overlooked in higher education is how
the demolition of Jefferson's "wall of separation" has resulted in substantial
financial benefits to private colleges and universities without improving
student choice.

183. Kemerer, supra note 60, at 38.
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